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Abstract— Machine learning models have made many deci-
sion support systems to be faster, more accurate and more
efficient. However, applications of machine learning in network
security face more disproportionate threat of active adversarial
attacks compared to other domains. This is because machine
learning applications in network security such as malware
detection, intrusion detection, and spam filtering are by them-
selves adversarial in nature. In what could be considered
an arms race between attackers and defenders, adversaries
constantly probe machine learning systems with inputs which
are explicitly designed to bypass the system and induce a
wrong prediction. In this survey, we first provide a taxonomy
of machine learning techniques, styles, and algorithms. We
then introduce a classification of machine learning in network
security applications. Next, we examine various adversarial
attacks against machine learning in network security and
introduce two classification approaches for adversarial attacks
in network security. First, we classify adversarial attacks in
network security based on a taxonomy of network security
applications. Secondly, we categorize adversarial attacks in
network security into a problem space vs. feature space di-
mensional classification model. We then analyze the various
defenses against adversarial attacks on machine learning-based
network security applications. We conclude by introducing an
adversarial risk model and evaluate several existing adversarial
attacks against machine learning in network security using the
risk model. We also identify where each attack classification
resides within the adversarial risk model.
Keywords: Machine Learning, Adversarial examples, Net-
work security
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an ever-increasing application of machine
learning and deep learning techniques in network security.
It, however, introduces a new challenge since security and
robustness of these models is usually not a huge consid-
eration for machine learning algorithm designers who are
more focused on designing effective and efficient models.
This creates room for various forms of attack models against
machine learning-based network security applications.
Researchers [1][2][3][4] have shown that the presence
of adversarial examples can easily fool machine learning
systems. Adversarial examples are specially crafted inputs
that cause a machine learning model to classify an input
wrongly. Machine learning systems typically take in input
data in two distinct phases. The training data which is fed
into the learning algorithm during the training phase, and
the new or test data which is fed into the learned model
during the prediction phase. If the attacker can manipulate
the input data in either phase, it is possible to induce a wrong
prediction from the machine learning model.
In this survey, we provide a brief introduction to machine
learning using a three-dimensional classification method. We
classify the various machine learning techniques based on
the learning tasks, learning styles and learning depth. We
further organize the various applications of machine learning
in network security based on a taxonomy of security tasks.
Next, we classify the various adversarial attacks based on the
applications in network security. We identify five main cate-
gories of machine learning applications in network security
for our classification method. Finally, we classify adversarial
attacks against machine learning based on a taxonomy of
network security applications.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we introduce a new
method for classifying adversarial attacks in network security
based on a taxonomy of network security applications. We
also introduce the concept of problem space and feature
space dimensional classification of adversarial attacks in
network security.
Secondly, we introduce the concept of adversarial risk in
computer and network security. We provide a new model for
evaluating the risk of adversarial attacks in network security
based on the discriminative or directive autonomy of the
machine learning tasks and styles respectively.
Lastly, we evaluate several adversarial attacks against ma-
chine learning in network security applications as proposed
by various researchers and classify the attacks based on an
adversarial threat model taxonomy.
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no
prior work that has reviewed adversarial attacks in network
security based on a classification of network security ap-
plications. No prior work has also reviewed the concept of
problem space vs. feature space dimensional classification of
adversarial attacks in network security. Also, this is the first
work to propose an adversarial machine learning risk model
in the field of network security based on the directive or
discriminative autonomy of the machine learning algorithms.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attacks have been widely studied in the field
of computer vision [13][14][15] with several attack meth-
ods and techniques developed mostly for image recognition
tasks. Researchers have discussed the public safety concern
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RELATED WORK
Reference Year Summary
Buczak et al. [5] 2015 Survey focused on complexity and challenges of machine learning based cybersecurity intrusion detection
Gardiner et al. [6] 2016 On the security of machine learning in malware C&C detection: A Survey
Liu et al. [7] 2018 A survey on security threats and defensive techniques of machine learning: A data driven view
Duddu et al. [8] 2018 A survey of adversarial machine learning in cyberwarfare
Akhtar et al. [9] 2018 A survey of adversarial attacks against deep learning in computer vision
Biggio and Roli [10] 2018 Provided an historical timeline of adversarial machine learning over a 10 year period
Zhang et al. [11] 2019 Discussed adversarial attacks as a limitation of deep learning in mobile and wireless networking.
Qui et al. [12] 2019 Generalized survey of adversarial attacks in with brief reference to cloud security, malware detection and intrusion detection.
of adversarial attacks such as in self-driving cars which
could be fooled into mis-classifying a stop sign resulting
in a potentially fatal outcome [16]. In network security,
the consequences of adversarial attacks are equally signif-
icant [17] especially in areas such as intrusion detection
[18] and malware detection [19] where there have been
rapid progress in the adoption of machine learning for
such tasks. Even though adversarial machine learning has
recently been widely researched in network security, to the
best of our knowledge, there is currently no publication
that has surveyed the vast number of growing research
work on adversarial machine learning in this field. Some
existing survey papers we reviewed include Akhtar et al.
[9] which reviewed adversarial attacks against deep learning
in computer vision. Qui et al [12] provided a generalized
survey on adversarial attacks in artificial intelligence, with
a brief discussion on cloud security, malware detection and
intrusion detection. Liu et al. [7] reviewed security threats
and corresponding defensive techniques of machine learning
focusing on the threats in the learning algorithms. Duddu
el al. in [8] discussed various research work on adversarial
machine learning in cyberwarfare, with some mention of ad-
versarial attacks against malware classifiers. Zhang et al. [11]
discussed adversarial attacks as a limitation of deep learning
in mobile and wireless networking but did not consider
deep learning in the context of network security applications.
Buczak et al. [5] in their survey on machine learning-based
cybersecurity intrusion detection focused on complexity and
challenges of machine learning in cybersecurity but did not
review adversarial attacks in their study. Biggio and Roli
[10] provided an historical timeline of adversarial machine
learning in the context of computer vision and cybersecurity
but their work did not provide a detailed review in the
context of network security. Gardiner et al. [6] in their survey
on the security of machine learning in malware detection,
focused on reviewing the Call and Control (C & C) detection
techniques. They also identified what the weaknesses were
and explained the limitations of secure machine learning
algorithms in malware detection systems.
None of these previous survey papers shown in Table I
has explored the vast amount of research work currently
ongoing on the topic of adversarial machine learning in
network security in a manner that categorizes them based on
security applications, problem or feature space dimensional
classification and adversarial risk modelling.
III. TAXONOMY AND BACKGROUND
Machine learning enables computers learn to solve specific
tasks and make predictions based on past observations [20].
Machine learning algorithms vary significantly, and can be
grouped by either task similarity in performing functions, the
learning style or the depth of learning. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.
A. Machine Learning Styles
We classify machine learning algorithms based on the style
in which the model is trained with data. The learning style of
the machine learning algorithm has a direct relationship with
the directive autonomy of the model discussed in section VI.
1) Supervised Learning: In supervised machine learning,
the model learns from a training dataset that consists of a
labeled input and desired output pairs. It generates a mapping
function that maps between the input (x) and output (y) by
analyzing the training dataset to produce a mapping function
[21]. Typical applications of supervised learning are for
Regression and Classification tasks.
2) Unsupervised Learning: For certain applications where
a labelled dataset is not readily available, a different approach
to learning is required. Unsupervised learning styles train
a model without providing a labeled input or any output
variable to be predicted [22]. Unsupervised learning may be
used for clustering some input data based on the information
and characteristic of the data. Dimensionality Reduction
and Association Rule Learning are typical applications of
unsupervised learning.
3) Semi-Supervised Learning: In semi-supervised learn-
ing, a large amount of unlabeled data with labeled data
is used to achieve a better classifier model [23]. Usually,
classifiers are trained by using labeled data that consist
of input and output pairs and features. Collecting labeled
data is often hard, expensive, time-consuming and requires
experienced user input [23]. Unlabeled data is easy to collect,
but they are limited in terms of usage. Examples of tasks that
make use of semi-supervised learning include Regression and
Classification.
Fig. 1. Three Dimensions of Machine Learning Classification
4) Active Learning: Active learning allows for selection
of the training data actively and with extra flexibility. This
reduces the need for a large amount of labeled data by
influencing the selection of data required for training [24].
The primary motivation of active learning starts from the cost
and time of collecting labeled training dataset.
5) Reinforcement Learning: Reinforcement learning ex-
poses and interacts with its environment and learns from the
consequences of its action using trial and error. It is trained
to make accurate decisions for the future action by capturing
the learned knowledge and its experience [22].
6) Ensemble Learning: Ensemble learning combines mul-
tiple weak classifiers to create a stronger classifier model
[25] by taking their individual decisions and their predictions
to combine them. Boosting and Bagging are examples of
ensemble learning.
B. Machine Learning based on Depth
Schmidhuber et al. [26] classify machine learning into
shallow and deep learning which distinguishes the machine
learning techniques based on how deep the credit assignment
path is.
1) Shallow Learning: Shallow learning refers to the
approach of standard machine learning models which do
not utilize multiple hidden connection or layers. Shallow
learning models do not suffer from vanishing gradient and
the complexity of computations that come from the growth
of connections. However, shallow models are usually limited
and unable to capture correlation across the modulates [27].
2) Deep Learning: Deep learning involves the use of
a multi-layer stack of simple modules [28]. Deep Learn-
ing overcomes scalability and complicated problems and is
mostly being used for solving major critical scientific related
problems on a large scale [9].
Fig. 2. Machine Learning Tasks
C. Machine Learning based on Tasks
Machine learning is used to perform various types of tasks
based on the required approach and the type of data available.
All machine learning techniques can be divided into six task
categories as illustrated in Figure 2.
IV. ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
Adversarial attacks have been studied for more than a
decade now. However, the first notable discovery in adver-
sarial attacks for computer vision was by Szegedy et al.
[29] who reported that a small perturbation in the form
of a carefully crafted input could confuse a deep neural
network to misclassify an image object. Other researchers
have demonstrated the use of adversarial attacks beyond
image classification [30][31][32][33].
A. Adversarial Samples
A major component of an adversarial attack is the adver-
sarial example. An adversarial sample consists of an input
to a machine learning model which has been perturbed.
For a particular dataset with features x and label y, a
corresponding adversarial sample is a specific data point x’
which causes a classifier c to predict a different label on x’
other than y, but x’ is almost indistinguishable from x.
The adversarial samples are created using one of many
optimization methods known as adversarial attack methods.
Crafting adversarial samples involves solving an optimiza-
tion problem to determine the minimum perturbation which
maximizes the loss for the neural network
Considering an input x, and a classifier f, the optimization
goal for the adversary is to compute such perturbation with a
small norm, measured w.r.t some distance metric, that would
modify the output of the classifier such that
f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)
where δ is the perturbation.
Fig. 3. Adversarial Threat Model
B. Adversarial Threat Model
We examine the threat model in Figure 3 to consider
the goals and capabilities of any adversary for a machine
learning system. Adversarial attack threats may be consid-
ered based on the attacker’s knowledge, attack goals, attack
timing, attack frequency, and attack falsification.
• Attacker’s Knowledge - White-box vs Black-box attacks:
In white-box attacks, the attacker knows the exact
information about the learning algorithm or the learned
model. In contrast, black-box attacks assume that the
adversary has limited or no knowledge about the learn-
ing algorithm or the learned model.
• Attacker’s Goal - Targeted vs Reliability attacks: In
targeted attacks, the attacker has a specific goal with
regard to the model decision. Most commonly, the
attacker would aim to induce a definite prediction from
the machine learning model. On the other hand, a
reliability attack occurs when the attacker only seeks to
maximize the prediction error of the machine learning
model without necessarily inducing a specific outcome.
Yevgeny et al. [17] have noted that the distinction
between reliability and targeted attacks becomes blurred
in attacks on binary classification tasks such as malware
binary classification.
• Attack Timing - Evasion vs Poisoning attacks: In evasion
attacks, also known as exploratory attack or attack at
decision time, the attacker aims to confuse the decision
of the machine learning model after it has been learned
as shown in Figure 4. This is in contrast to poisoning
attacks, also known as causative attack, which involves
adversarial corruption of the training data before train-
ing to induce a wrong prediction from the machine
learning mode as shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 4. Evasion Attack
Fig. 5. Poisoning Attack
• Attack Frequency - One-shot vs Iterative attacks: Adver-
sarial attacks are also classified based on the frequency
with which the adversarial samples are updated or
optimized. One-shot or one-time attacks are attacks
in which the adversarial examples are optimized just
once. Iterative attacks, however, involve updating the
adversarial examples multiple times. By updating the
adversarial samples multiple times, the samples are
better optimized and perform better compared to one-
shot attacks. However, iterative attacks cost more com-
putational time to generate. Adversarial attacks against
certain machine learning styles which are computation-
ally intensive such as reinforcement learning usually
demand one-shot attacks as the only feasible approach
[34]
• Attack Falsification - False-positive vs False-Negative
attacks: False positive attacks cause a machine learning
model to mis-classify a negative sample as a positive
one. For example, a malware is being classified as
a benign in a false positive attack. A false negative
attack in contrast results in a positive sample being
misclassified as a negative sample.
V. MACHINE LEARNING TASKS IN NETWORK SECURITY
A. Regression (Prediction) Tasks in Network Security
Regression tasks involve methods for predicting next series
of information from prior data [20]. In network security,
a regression model is used to predict relevant parameters
from network packet and then draw a comparison between
them with the regular parameters [35]. Kolosnjaji et al.
[36] used regression models for predicting system calls
for executable processes to derive a relationship the actual
processes. Also, regression algorithms are used for anomaly
detection in computer networks, user behavior analytics
(e.g., Human Interaction Proofs) and predicting anomalies in
process behaviour [37] such as credit card fraud transactions.
Example of ML algorithms for regression tasks are Linear
regression, Polynomial regression, Ridge regression, Support
Vector Regression, Decision trees, Random Forest. Deep
Learning algorithms for regression tasks include Artificial
neural networks, Recurrent neural networks, Neural tuning
machines and Differentiable Neural Computer.
B. Classification Tasks in Network Security
Classification tasks involve categorizing data into differ-
ent categories from pre-labeled examples [38]. In network
security, classification task model is used in detecting known
types of fraud [37], and for grouping different users like in
social spammers [39]. Also, it is used to categorize programs
and files as malware, spyware, and ransomware, and to
identify different classes of network attacks. Example of
algorithms for classification tasks are Logistic regression,
Decision Trees, Random Forests, Artificial neural networks,
Support vector machines and Convolutional Neural Net-
works.
C. Clustering Task in Network Security
Clustering tasks are used to group the input data by
similarity or patterns into unknown classes [22]. Clustering
task is used to compare industry and business processes [40]
and detect outliers. Girma et al. used clustering to detect
DDOS attacks [41]. Also, the clustering task is used in
forensic analysis. Examples of clustering algorithms are K-
nearest neighbors, K-means, Mixture model, Self-organized
Maps (SOM) and Kohonen Networks.
D. Association Rule Learning (Recommendation) Task in
Network Security
Association Rule Learning (ARL) involves the discovery
of rules and relations that describe large portions of data
and find the link between X and Y where the X is the
antecedent and Y is the consequence of rule [22]. Common
ARL algorithms include Apriori, Euclat, and Deep belief
networks.
E. Dimensional Reduction (Generalization) Task In Network
Security
Dimensionality reduction encodes a multi-dimensional
dataset into a compact lower dimensional representation
while preserving as much information as possible in the orig-
inal dataset. Example algorithms are Principal Component
Analysis, Singular Value Decomposition, Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis, Independent Component Analysis.
F. Generative Modelling Task In Network Security
Generative modelling tasks involve training a model by
learning the data distribution within a training dataset. Sub-
sequently, new data points are generated and associated
decisions are made to simulate an entirely new data sample.
Examples of algorithms for generative modelling tasks in-
clude Markov Chains, Variational Auto-encoders, Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) and Boltzmann Machines.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING IN
NETWORK SECURITY
Machine learning techniques have been increasingly used
to carry out a wide range of tasks in network security [42].
In this section, we review and highlight some applications
of machine learning in network security by classifying them
into five categories.
A. Machine Learning for Network Protection
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are essential solutions
for monitoring events dynamically in a computer network
or system. Essentially there are two types of IDS (signature
based and anomaly based) [43]. Signature based IDS detects
attacks based on the repository of attacks signatures with no
false alarm [44]. However, zero-day attacks can easily by-
pass signature-based IDS. Anomaly IDS [44] uses machine
learning and can detect a new type of attacks and anomalies.
A typical disadvantage of anomaly IDS is the tendency to
generate a significant number of false positive alarms.
1) Hybrid Approach for Alarm Verification: Sima et al.
[45] designed and built Hybrid Alarm Verification System
that requires processing a significant number of real-time
alarms, high accuracy in classifying false alarms, perform
historical data analysis. The proposed system consists of
three components: Machine Learning, Stream processing and
Batch processing (Alarm History). Machine learning model
trained offline and used for verification service that can
immediately classify true or false alarms. They used different
machine learning algorithms in the experiments to show the
effectiveness of their system where the accuracy achieves
more than 90% in a stream of 30K alarms per second [45].
2) Learning Intrusion Detection: Laskov et al. [46]
worked in developing a framework to compare the supervised
learning (classication) and unsupervised learning (clustering)
techniques for detecting intrusions and malicious. They used
different methods in supervised learning to evaluate the work
include k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), decision trees, Support
Vector Machines (SVM) and Multi-Layer Perception (MLP).
Also, k-means clustering was utilized, with single linkage
clustering as unsupervised algorithms. The evaluation was
ran under two scenarios to evaluate how much the IDS could
generalize its knowledge to new malicious activities. The
supervised algorithms showed better classification with the
known attacks. The best result among the supervised algo-
rithm was the decision tree algorithm whiched achieved 95%
true positive and 1% false positive rate, followed by MLP,
SVM and then KNN. If there were new attacks not previously
seen in the training data, the accuracy decreases significantly.
However, the unsupervised algorithms performed better for
unseen attacks and did not show signicant dierence in accu-
racy for seen and unseen attacks [46].
B. Machine Learning for Endpoint Protection
Malware detection is a significant part of endpoint security
including workstations, servers, cloud instances, and mobile
devices. Malware detection is used to detect and identify
malicious activities caused by malware. With the increase in
the variety of malware activities, the need for automatic de-
tection and classifier amplifies as well. The signature-based
malware detection system is commonly used for existing
malware that has a signature but it not suitable for unknown
malware or zero-day malware. Machine learning can cope
with this increase and discover underlying patterns in large-
scale datasets [36].
1) Automatic Analysis of Malware Behavior: Rieck et
al. [47] successfully proposed a framework for analyzing
malware behavior automatically using various machine learn-
ing techniques. The framework allows clustering similar
malware behaviors into classes and assigns new malware
to these discovered classes. They designed an incremental
approach for the behavior analysis that can process various
malware behaviors and reduce the run-time defense against
malware development comparing to other analysis methods
and provide accurate discovery of novel malware. To im-
plement this automatic framework, they collected a large
number of malware samples and monitored their behaviors
using a sandbox environment and learn those behaviors using
Clustering and Classification algorithms [47].
2) Automated Multi-level Malware Detection System: In
[48], authors proposed Advanced Virtual Machine Monitor-
based guest-assisted Automated Multilevel Malware Detec-
tion System (AMMDS) that affect both Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) and Memory Forensic Analysis (MFA)
techniques to mitigate in real time symptoms of stealthily
hidden processes on guest OS [48]. They use different
machine learning techniques such as Logistic Regression,
Random Forest, Naive Bayes, Random Tree, Sequential Min-
imal Optimization (SMO), and J48 to evaluate the AMMDS
and the results achieve 100%.
3) Classication of Malware System Call Sequences:
Kolosnjaji et al. [36] focused on the utilization of neural
networks by stacking layers according to deep learning to
improve the classication of newly retrieved malware samples
into a predened set of malware classes. They constructed
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) layers for modeling System Call Sequences.
The sequences used by the CNN layers was based on a
set of n-grams. The presence of the n-grams and their
relation were counted in a behavioral trace. The RNN on
the other hand used sequential information to train the
model. A dependence between the system call appearance
and the system call sequence was however maintained. If
this model was trained properly, it usually provided better
accuracy on subsequent data and most often captured more
training set information. This deep learning technique for
capturing the relation between the n-grams in the system call
sequences was deemed to be relatively efficient as it achieved
90% average accuracy, precision and recall for most of the
malware families [36].
4) A Hybrid Malicious Code Detection Method: Li et
al. [49] proposed a hybrid malicious code detection scheme
based on AutoEncoder and Deep Belief Networks (DBN).
They used the AutoEncoder to reduce the dimensionality
of data by extracting the main features. Then they used
the DBN that composed multilayer Restricted Boltzmann
Machines (RBM) and a layer of BP neural network to detect
malicious code. The BP neural network has an input vector
from the last layer of RBM based on unsupervised learning
and then use supervised learning in the BP neural network.
They achieved the Optimal hybrid model. The experiment
results that are verified by KDDCUP’99 dataset show higher
accuracy compared to a single DBN and reduce the time
complexity [49].
C. Machine Learning for Application Security
Various machine learning tasks used for application se-
curity including malicious web attack detection, phishing
detection and spam detection.
1) Detection of Phishing Attacks: Basnet et al. [50]
studied and compared the effectiveness of using different
machine learning algorithms for classification of phishing
emails using many novel input features that helps in detecting
phishing attacks. The training dataset is labeled with phishing
or legitimate email. They used unsupervised learning to
extract features without prior training directly and provides
fast and reliable knowledge from the dataset. They used 4000
emails in total, A total of 2000 emails used for testing. They
used Support Vector Machines (SVM), Leave One Model
Out, Biased SVM, Neural Networks, Self Organizing Maps
(SOMs) and K-Means on the dataset. Consistently, Support
Vector Machine achieved the best results. The Biased Sup-
port Vector Machine (BSVM) and NN have an accuracy of
97.99% [50].
2) Adaptively Detecting Malicious Queries in Web At-
tacks: Don et al. [51] proposed a new system called AMODS
and learning strategy called SVM HYBRID for detecting
web attacks. AMODS is an adaptive system that aims to
periodically update the detection model to detect the latest
web attacks. The SVM HYBRID is an adaptive learning
strategy which was implemented primarily for reducing
manual work. The detection model was trained using dataset
which was obtained from an academic institutes web server
logs. The proposed detection model outperformed existing
web attack detection methods with an FP rate of 0.09%
and 94.79% F-value. The SVM Hybrid system obtained a
total number of malicious queries equal to 2.78 times by the
popular SVM method. Also, the Web Application Firewall
(WAF) can use malicious queries to update the signature
library. The significant queries were used for updating the
detection model which consisted of a meta-classifier as well
as other three base classifiers [51].
3) URLNet -Learning a URL Representation with Deep
Learning for Malicious URL Detection: Le et al. [52]
proposed an end-to-end deep learning framework which did
not require sophisticated feature. URLNet was introduced to
address several limitations which was found with the other
model approaches. This framework learns from the URL
directly how to perform a nonlinear URL embedding which
then enabled it to successfully detect various Malicious
URLs. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) were applied
to both the characters and words of each URL to discover
the URL embedding method. They also proposed advanced
word-embedding techniques to deal with uncommon words,
which was a limitation being experienced by other malicious
URL detection systems. The framework then learns from
unknown works at testing phase [52].
D. Machine Learning for User Behavior Analytic
User behavior analytics is a cybersecurity process which
involves analyzing patterns in human behaviors and detecting
anomalies that give an indication of fraudulent activities
or insider threats. Machine learning algorithms are used to
detect such anomalies in user actions such as unusual login
tries and to infer useful knowledge from those patterns.
1) Authentication with Keystroke Dynamics: Revett et al.
[53] proposed a system using Probabilistic Neural Network
(PNN) for keystroke dynamics that captures the typing
style of a user. A system comprising of 50 user login
credential keystrokes was evaluated. The authors [53] used
eight attributes to monitor the enrollment and authentication
attempts. An accuracy of 90% was obtained in classifying
legitimate users from imposters. A comparison of the training
time between the PNN system and a Multi-Layer Perception
Neural Network (MLPNN) showed that the PNN was four
times faster.
2) Text-based CAPTCHA Strengths and Weaknesses:
Bursztein et al. [54] in a study showed that several well
known websites still implemented technologies that have
been proven to be vulnerable to cyber attacks. In the study,
an automated Decaptcha tool was tested on numerous web-
sites including well known names such as eBay, Google
and Wikipedia. It was observed that 13 out of 15 widely
used web technologies were vulnerable to their automated
attack. They had a significant success rate for most of the
websites. Only Google and Recaptacha were able to resist
to the automated attack. Their study revealed the need for
more robust CAPTCHA designs in most of the widely used
schemes. Authors recommended that the schemes should
not rely on segmentation alone because it did not provide
sufficient defense against automated attacks.
3) Social Network Spam Detection: K. Lee et al. [39]
proposed social network spam detection that gathers legit-
imate and spam profiles and feeds them to Support Vector
Machine (SVM) model. K. Lee et al.[39] selected two social
networks: Twitter and MySpace to evaluate the proposed
machine learning system. They collected data over months
and feed them to the SVM classifier. The dataset contains
388 legitimate profiles and 627 spam profiles collected from
MySpace, and 104 legitimate profiles and 168 profiles be-
tween promoters and spammers collected from Twitter. The
system achieved a low false positive rate and high precision
up to 70% for MySpace and 82% for Twitter.
E. Machine Learning for Process Behavior Analytic
Machine learning applications usually necessitate the need
to learn and have some domain knowledge about business
process behaviors in order to detect anomalous behaviors.
Machine learning could be used for determining fraudulent
transactions within banking systems. Also it was been suc-
cessfully used for identifying outliers, classifying types of
fraud and for clustering various business processes.
1) Anomaly detection in Industrial Control Systems:
Kravch et al.[40] performed a successful study on Secure-
Water Treatment Testeb (SWat) using Deep Convolutional
Neural Networks CNN to detect most of attacks on Industrial
Control System (ICS) with a low false positive. The anomaly
detection method was based on the statistical deviation mea-
surement of the predicted value. They performed the study
using 36 different attacks from SWat. The authors in [40]
proofed that using 1D convolutional networks in anomaly
detection in ICS outperformed the recurrent networks.
2) Detecting Credit Card Fraud: Traditionally, the Fraud
Detection System uses old transactions data to predict a new
transaction. Fraud Detection System (FDS) should encounter
various potential challenges and difficulties to achieve high
accuracy and performance [55]. The traditional detection
method does not solve all problems and challenges including
imbalanced data where there is a small chance of transactions
are fraudulent. Wrong classification and overlapping data and
Fraud detection cost are other major challenges [55]. Chen et
al. [37] proposed an approach to solving the listed challenges
and problems for Credit Card fraud. They introduced a
system to prevent fraud from the initial use of credit cards
by collecting user data from online questionnaire based on
consumer behavior surveys. They used various classifiers
models: decision tree (C5.0, CandRT, CHAID) and SVM
( linear and radial basis, Kernels of polynomial, sigmoid).
They use three datasets to develop questionnaire-responded
transaction (QRT) model to predict new transaction.
3) Deep Learning Techniques for Side-Channel Analysis:
Prouff et al. [56] defined Side-Channel Analysis as a type
of attack that attempts to leak information from a system by
exploiting some parameters from the physical environment
[56]. This attack was utilizing the running-time of some
cryptographic computation, especially in the block ciphers.
The capability of a system to resist side-channel attacks
(SCA) requires an evaluation strategy that focuses on de-
ducing the relationship between the device behavior and the
sensitivity of the information that is common in classical
cryptography. The authors in [56] focused on proposing an
extensive study of using deep learning algorithms in the
Side-Channel Analysis. Also, they focused on the hyper-
parameters selection to help in designing new deep learning
classifier and models. They confirmed that the Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) models are better in detecting
SCA. Their proposal system outperformed the other tested
models on highly desynchronized traces and had the best
performance as well on small desynchronized trace [56].
VII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK METHODS AND
ALGORITHMS
We recall that adversarial attacks could be deployed either
during decision time (evasion attacks) or during training time
(poisoning attacks). In each case, the training algorithm (for
poisoning attacks) or the learned model (for evasion attacks)
is being manipulated with some form of carefully crafted
input known as the adversarial samples. A common trend
among the attack methods below reveals that the robustness
of a machine learning model to a large extent depends on
the ability of an attacker to find an adversarial sample that
is as close as possible to the original input. In this section,
we evaluate the primary methods for generating adversarial
samples. It should be noted that recent research has shown
the limitations of some earlier methods that are still listed
here for reference even though more effective methods have
been introduced.
1) L-BFGS: Szegedy et al. [29] studied how adversarial
examples could be generated against neural networks for im-
age classification. The L-BFGS (Limited Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno) method was then introduced which used
an expensive linear search method to find the optimal values
of the adversarial samples.
2) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): In a different
approach proposed by Goodfellow et al. [1], adversarial
examples are created by finding the maximal direction of
positive change in the loss. This is a faster method compared
to the L-BFGS method since only a one-step gradient update
is performed along the direction of the sign gradient at each
level.
3) Basic Iterative Method (BIM): A major limitation of
the Fast Gradient Sign Method and similar attack methods is
that they work based on the assumption that the adversarial
samples can be fed directly into the machine learning model.
This is far from being practical since most attackers would
seek to access the machine learning models through devices
such as sensors [57]. The Basic Iterative Method proposed in
[58] overcomes this limitation by running the gradient update
in multiple iterations.
4) Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA): The
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) was introduced
by Papernot et al. [4]. For the attack, the Jacobian matrix
of a given sample is computed to find the input features
of that sample which most significantly impacts the output.
Subsequently, a small perturbation is created based on that
input feature for generating the adversarial attack.
5) DeepFool: DeepFool was proposed by Moosavi et
al. [3] as a method for creating adversarial examples by
finding out the closest distance between original input and
the decision boundary for adversarial examples. They were
able to determine that by using a related classifier, the closest
distance which would correspond to the minimal perturbation
for creating an adversarial sample will be the distance to the
hyperplane of the related classifier.
6) Carlini and Wagner Attack: Carlini et al. [59] devel-
oped a targeted attack specifically for existing adversarial
defense methods. It was discovered that defenses such as
defensive distillation were ineffective towards the Carlini and
Wagner attack.
VIII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we introduce a classification method for
adversarial attacks in network security. We base our classifi-
cation on a taxonomy of network security applications which
was earlier discussed in section VI.
A. Adversarial attacks on ML for endpoint protection
A major component of endpoint protection in network
security is malware detection. Yet, malware detection re-
mains a challenging problem in network security. Between
2009 and 2019, the number of new malware digital signa-
tures has increased by over 2000 percent [60]. Therefore,
traditional malware detection systems that rely solely on
digital signatures have become less effective. Significant
effort has been made in the use of machine learning to protect
against malware attacks. Several researches have shown the
vulnerability of these machine learning models to adversarial
attacks.
1) Iagodroid: One of the earliest attacks against machine
learning based malware detection systems was the Iagodroid
attack [61]. Iagodroid uses a method to induce mislabelling
of malware families during the triaging process of malware
samples.
2) Texture Perturbation Attacks: Researchers have de-
ployed visualization techniques similar to computer vision
and adapted it for malware classification [62]. This involves
conversion of malware binary code into image data. The
Adversarial Texture Malware Perturbation Attack (ATMPA)
achieved a 100 percent effectiveness in defeating visualiza-
tion based machine learning malware detection system and
also resulted in 88.7 percent transfer-ability rate [19]. The
attack model for ATMPA works by allowing the attacker
to distort the malware image data during the visualization
process.
3) EvnAttack: EvnAttack is an evasion attack model that
was proposed in [32] which manipulates an optimal portion
of the features of a malware executable file in a bi-directional
way such that the malware is able to evade detection from
a machine learning model based on the observation that
the API calls differently contribute to the classification of
malware and benign files.
4) AdvAttack: AdvAttack was proposed in [30] as a novel
attack method to evade detection with the adversarial cost as
low as possible. This is achieved by manipulating the API
calls by injecting more of those features which are most
relevant to benign files and removing those features with
higher relevance scores to malware.
5) MalGAN: To combat the limitations of traditional
gradient-based adversarial example generation, the use of a
generative adversarial network (GAN) based algorithm for
generating adversarial examples has been proposed. Gener-
ative models have been mostly used for input reconstruction
by encoding an original image into a lower-dimensional
latent representation [2]. The latent representation of the
original input can be used to distort the initial input to
create an adversarial sample. MalGAN proposed by [63]
leverages on generative modeling techniques to evade black-
box malware detection systems with a detection rate close
to zero.
6) Slack Attacks: A byte-based convolutional neural net-
work (MalConv) was introduced in [64]. Unlike image
perturbation attacks [29], where the fidelity of the image is
of little concern, attacks that alter the binaries of malware
files must maintain the semantic fidelity of the original file
because altering the bytes of the malware arbitrarily could
affect the malicious effect of the malware. This problem
could be solved by appending adversarial noise to the end
of the binary [33]. This prevents the added noise from
affecting the malware functionality. The Random Append
attack and Gradient Append attacks are two types of append
attacks which work by appending byte values from a uniform
distribution sample and gradually modifying the appended
byte values using the input gradient value. Two additional
variations of append attacks; the benign append and the FGM
Append were introduced by [65] which improves the long
convergence time experienced in previous attacks.
When malware binaries have exceeded the model’s maxi-
mum size, it is impossible to append additional bytes to them.
Hence a slack attack proposed by [65] exploits the existing
bytes of the malware binaries. The most common form of
the slack attack is the Slack FGM Attack which defines a set
of slack bytes that can be freely modified without breaking
the malware functionality.
B. Adversarial attacks on ML for network protection
1) IDSGAN: IDSGAN was proposed in [66] for generat-
ing adversarial attacks targeted towards intrusion detection
systems. IDSGAN is based on the Wasserstein GAN [67]
which uses a generator, discriminator and a black-box. The
discriminator is used to imitate the black-box intrusion
detection system and at the same time provide the malicious
traffic samples.
2) TCP Obfuscation Techniques: Another method for
evading machine learning based intrusion detection systems
is the use of obfuscation techniques.[68] proposed the mod-
ification of various properties of network connections to
obfuscate a TCP communication which successfully evades
a wide variety of intrusion detection classifiers.
C. Adversarial attacks on ML for Application Security
1) Attacks on Statistical Spam filters: Several spam filters
such as SpamAssasin, SpamBayes, Bogofilter are based
on the popular Naive Bayes Machine learning algorithm
which was first applied to filtering junk email in 1998
[69]. A variety of good word attacks introduced by [70]
were successfully evading the machine learning models from
detecting spam or junk emails.
D. Adversarial attacks on ML for User Behavior Analytics
1) Attacks against crowd-turfing detection systems: Ma-
chine learning techniques are used to identify misbehavior
includes fake users in social networks and detect users who
pays for sites to have fake accounts. Malicious crowdsourc-
ing or crowd-turfing systems are used to connect users who
are willing to pay, with workers who carry out malicious
activities such as generation and distribution of fake news,
or malicious political campaigns. Machine learning models
have been used to detect crowdturfing activity with up to
95 percent accuracy particularly in detecting the accounts of
crowdturfing workers [71]. However, malicious crowdsourc-
ing detection systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial
evasion and poisoning attacks.
2) Attacks Against ML for Keystroke Dynamics: Authors
[72] created adversarial keystroke samples that misled an
otherwise accurate classifier into accepting the artificially
generated keystroke samples as belonging to an authentic
user.
E. Adversarial attacks on ML for Process Behavior Analytics
1) Attacks against ML for credit card fraud detection:
[73] examined how a logistic regression classifier used
as a fraud detection mechanism, could be adversarially
attacked to cause a number of fraudulent transactions to
go undetected. Previous studies have similar models which
are based on game theory to investigate adversarial attacks
against credit card fraud detection and email spam detectors.
However, the authors introduced a new framework which
successfully produced an improved AUC score on multiple
iterations of the validation sets compared to the performance
of the models which credit card companies had previously
used.
IX. EVALUATING ADVERSARIAL RISK
In discussing adversarial risk, we introduce the concept of
discriminative and directive autonomy of machine learning
models. The two-fold goal of an adversarial risk model is to
evaluate the likelihood of success of an adversarial attack
against a machine learning model, and the consequence
of that attack if successful. We present in this paper, an
adversarial risk model shown in Figure 6 based on the level
of autonomy of the machine learning model with respect to
the learning style and task. The concept of discriminative
autonomy and directive autonomy of the machine learning
Fig. 6. Adversarial Risk Model
models represents a novel approach for evaluating the relative
adversarial risk of a machine learning model.
• Discriminative Autonomy: The discriminative autonomy
is directly related to the type of task being performed
by the machine learning model. Machine learning tasks
such as classification are highly dependent on the input
data. As such, they have lower discriminative or condi-
tional autonomy compared to tasks such as generative
modeling which depend less on the input data when
predicting an outcome.
• Directive autonomy: The directive autonomy of a ma-
chine learning model is a function of the machine
learning style. In supervised machine learning, there is
less directive autonomy since the model needs to be
first learned with some form of labeled data. Machine
learning styles such as reinforcement learning depend
less on a model being learned with any form of training
data and posses much higher directive autonomy.
X. DEFENDING AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Barreno et al. [15] first proposed three broad approaches
for defending machine learning algorithms against adversar-
ial attacks. Regularization, Randomization, and Information
hiding. Yuan et al. [57] classified the defenses into two broad
strategies. Proactive strategies and reactive strategies. In this
section, we provide the most common attack methods in use
today and classify them based on the strategy and approach.
Our classification is illustraded in Table II.
1) Gradient masking: The gradient masking method mod-
ifies a machine learning model in an attempt to obscure its
gradient from an attacker. Nayebi et al [74] demonstrated the
effect of gradient masking by saturating the sigmoid network
which results in a vanishing gradient effect.
2) Defensive Distillation: Distillation technique was orig-
inally proposed by Hinton et al. [78] for transferring knowl-
edge from large neural networks to smaller ones. It was
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENSE METHODS
Method Strategy Approach
Gradient Masking [74] Proactive Information hiding
Defensive Distillation [75] Reactive Randomization
Adversarial Training [29] Proactive Regularization
Detecting adversarial Examples [76] Reactive Regularization
Feature Reduction [77] Proactive Regularization
adapted by Papernot et al. [75] to defend against adversarial
crafting by using the output of the original neural network
to train a smaller network rather than using the distillation
as originally proposed by Hinton. Defensive distillation was
initially tested against adversarial attacks in computer vision,
but further research is required to determine its effectiveness
in other applications such as malware detection.
3) Adversarial Training: Szegedy et al. [29] originally
proposed a three-step method known as adversarial training
for defending against adversarial attacks. 1, Train the classi-
fier on the original dataset 2, Generate adversarial samples
3, Iterate additional training epochs using the adversarial
examples. Adversarial training improves the classification
performance of the machine learning model and makes it
more resilient to adversarial crafting
4) Detecting Adversarial Examples: Several approaches
are used to detect the presence of adversarial examples in
the training phase of a machine learning model. One of
such approaches proposed by [76] works on the premise that
adversarial examples have a higher uncertainty that clean
data and uses a Bayesian neural network to estimate the
extent of uncertainty in the input data to detect the adversarial
samples. Other approaches include the use of probability
divergence proposed by [79] as well as the use of an auxiliary
network of the original network introduced by Metzen et al.
in [80]
5) Feature Reduction: Other potential defenses for adver-
sarial attacks have been proposed. Simple feature reduction
was evaluated by Grosse et al. [77] but was found inadequate
in defending against adversarial attacks.
6) Ensemble Defenses: Similar to the idea of ensem-
ble learning which combines one or more machine learn-
ing techniques, researchers have also proposed the use of
multiple defense strategies as a defense technique against
adversarial examples. PixelDefend was proposed by [81] to
combine adversarial detecting techniques with one or more
other methods for creating a more robust defense against
adversarial attacks.
XI. DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN
NETWORK SECURITY
In this section, we introduce specific solutions that have
been proposed for defending against adversarial attacks in
network security.
1) KUAFUDET Camouflage Detector: One method to im-
prove the accuracy of machine learning based malware clas-
sifiers is a novel malware camouflage detector - KUAFUDET
which significantly reduces false negatives and boosts the
detection accuracy by at least 15 percent. KUAFUDET uti-
lizes two-phase learning enhancing method which learns the
features of a malware sample through adversarial detection
[82].
2) SecureDroid: Another approach for adversarial defense
against machine learning based malware detection is the
SecureDroid defense [61] which integrates two methods -
the SecCLS and SecENS methods for enhancing Android
malware detection.
3) SecDefender: To achieve resilience against evasion
attacks, SecDefender [32] was proposed as a secure learning
paradigm for malware detection which is based on classifier
retraining techniques.
4) DroidEye: Adversarial android malware attacks can be
prevented with a system called DroidEye which implements
count featurization for feature transformation to harden the
machine learning classifier against the attacks [31].
5) SecureMD: In SecureMD proposed in [30], the ma-
chine learning malware detection classifier is enhanced
through the use of security regularization terms utilizing a
fitting constraint and a smoothness constraint. SecureMD has
improved detection accuracy by up to 93 percent.
6) Weighted Bagging: Biggio et al. [83] proposed the use
of bagging classifiers for preventing poisoning attacks against
machine learning based network protection systems. Bagging
uses bootstrap aggregation techniques to create bootstrap
replicates of the training set. The classifier is then trained on
the bootstrap replicates, and the predictions are aggregated.
7) Reject on Negative Impact (RONI): The reject on
negative impact technique has been proven to achieve 100
percent accuracy in detecting adversarial attacks against
intrusion detection systems.
8) Deepcloak: DeepCloak introduced by Ji Gao et al. [84]
works by removing unnecessary features that may be used
for generating adversarial samples.
XII. FEATURE SPACE AND PROBLEM SPACE -
DIMENSIONAL SPACE CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we categorize adversarial attacks based on
feature space and problem space. In the field of machine
learning, a problem space also known as state space can be
defined as a dimensional representation of all the possible
configurations of the objects in a problem determination
context. Conversely, a feature space is defined as the n
dimensional space in which all variables in the input dataset
are represented. We take as an example an intrusion detection
dataset with 70 variables, this represents a 70-dimensional
feature space.
A feature space adversarial attack in the context above will
seek to alter the feature space by making changes within
the 70-dimensional feature space. A feature space attack
modifies the features in the instance directly while a problem
space adversarial attack modifies the actual instance itself.
Using an example of malware adversarial attacks, a feature
space adversarial malware attack will only modify the feature
vectors but no new malware is created. A problem space
adversarial malware attack will modify the actual instance
from the source to produce a new instance of the malware.
Compared to a problem space adversarial attack, a feature
space adversarial attack does not generate a new sample but
creates a new feature vector.
Feature space modelling of an adversarial sample is a
method in which an optimization algorithm is used to find
the ideal value out of a finite number of arbitrary changes
made to the features. In a feature space adversarial attack, the
attacker’s objective is to remain benign without generating a
new instance.
Feature space and problem space dimensional classifica-
tion of various adversarial attacks are shown in Tables III and
IV respectively. From our observation, adversarial attacks in
problem space are more difficult to generate and also more
difficult to defend against.
XIII. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
We observed an increased risk of adversarial vulnerability
of machine learning models in network security with reduced
discriminative autonomy and directive autonomy. Similarly,
we observed a reduced risk of adversarial vulnerability with
increased discriminative autonomy and directive autonomy.
As illustrated in the adversarial risk model shown in Fig. 6,
the discriminative autonomy directly relates to the machine
learning tasks while the directive autonomy relates to the
machine learning style. The reason for the adversarial sen-
sitivity of the machine learning models to the discriminative
and directive autonomy based risk model is still an area of
open research.
Previous approaches on making machine learning in net-
work security more secure have advocated the development
of machine learning models that are resilient to adversarial
attacks. In this survey, we introduced the concept of an
element of reduced risk of adversarial attacks based on
an adversarial risk model. Our findings suggest that the
adversarial risk model provides a promising future for the
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF FEATURE SPACE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN NETWORK SECURITY AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
[* The misclassification rates provided in the table are as reported by individual authors in the respective publications. Since the platforms for
experimentation were not standardized, these numbers are not considered as an ideal benchmark comparison of adversarial misclassification effectiveness]
Attacks Classification Timing Goal Information Falsification Frequency *Misclassification
ATMPA [62] Endpoint protection Poisoning Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 97%
Good word Attacks [70] Application Security Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 40%
Slack Attack [65] Endpoint protection Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive One-Shot 20%
Attack on Keystroke dynamics [72] User Behavior Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 50%
IogoDroid [61] Endpoint protection Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 97%
TCP Obfuscation Attack [68] Network protection Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 70%
Attack on Crowdturfing detector [71] User Behavior Poisoning Reliability White-box False Positive Iterative 85%
Attack on Credit Card Fraud Detection [73] Process Behavior Poisoning Targeted Black-box False Positive Iterative NS
PDF Malware Evader [85] Endpoint protection Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 100%
EvnAttack [32] Endpoint protection Evasion Targeted White-box False Positive One-shot 97%
AdvAttack [30] Endpoint protection Poisoning Targeted White-box False Positive Iterative 90%
Malware Detection Feature Selection [86] Endpoint Protection Poisoning Reliability Black-box False Positive Iterative 20%
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF PROBLEM SPACE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN NETWORK SECURITY AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
[* The misclassification rates provided in the table are as reported by individual authors in the respective publications. Since the platforms for
experimentation were not standardized, these numbers are not considered as an ideal benchmark comparison of adversarial misclassification effectiveness]
Attacks Classification Timing Goal Information Falsification Frequency *Misclassification
DeepDGA Attack [87] Application Security Poisoning Targeted Black-box False Positive One-Shot 80%
MalGAN Attack [63] Endpoint protection Evasion Targeted Black-box False Positive Iterative 90%
IDSGAN Atack [66] Network protection Evasion Reliability White-box False Positive Iterative 99%
security of artificial intelligence and machine learning in
network security. Machine learning based network security
applications that are more resilient to adversarial attacks can
be designed by leveraging on the adversarial risk model.
We observed that the misclassification achieved by an
adversarial attack is dependent significantly on the design
of the adversarial attack algorithm with the context of each
specific attack . White-box, Evasion attacks against endpoint
protection systems (malware detection) are the most common
attacks. While there is limited research in adversarial attacks
against process behavior and user behavior analysis, use
cases of machine learning in network security, endpoint
protection, network protection and application security have
been well researched.
We reviewed defenses against adversarial attacks on ma-
chine learning applications in network security. We note that
there are two major limitations in the existing research on
adversarial defenses. Firstly, most defenses are designed to
protect against attacks on machine learning applications in
computer vision. Secondly, the defenses studied are usually
designed for a specific attack or a part of the attack. A
generalized defense model against adversarial attacks is
at best still theoretical as research on generalized defense
models is in early stages [88]. Furthermore, our findings
indicate that defenses against adversarial attacks are specific
to a particular type of attack and are not necessarily trans-
ferable. Recent research [89] have studied the transferability
in malware machine learning models in machine learning
applications such as malware detection.
XIV. CONCLUSION
We present a first of its kind survey on adversarial attacks
on machine learning in network security. The previous survey
[9] that we reviewed had only discussed adversarial attacks
against deep learning in computer vision.
We introduced a new classification for adversarial attacks
based on applications of machine learning in network secu-
rity and developed a matrix to correlate the various types of
adversarial attacks with a taxonomy-based classification to
determine their effectiveness in causing a misclassification.
We also presented a novel idea of the concept of an adver-
sarial risk model for machine learning in network security.
In our review on defenses against adversarial attacks,
although there were numerous proposed defenses against
specific adversarial attacks, research on generalized defenses
against adversarial attacks is still not well established [88]. In
our future work, we would study generalized defenses against
adversarial attacks to understand if a generalized approach
towards adversarial defenses will be effectively attainable.
In addition, we would examine the interpretability of the
adversarial risk model to further understand why the reduced
adversarial vulnerability occurs, and its implications for other
applications of machine learning such as computer vision and
natural language processing.
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